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Abstract―There are some parallelisms and similarities since the 1960s in the 
identification, attribution, scientific communication, and the subsequent initial policy 
setting processes of the acidification, ozone layer depletion, and climate change hazards. 
The anthropogenic factors behind the latter one were hypothesized well before the 
discovery of the cause-effect relations of the two other problems; nevertheless, later on 
the policy approaches to address the "acid rain" and "ozone shield" issues served to some 
extent as precedents for building up the international climate policy mechanisms. The 
analysis of these knowledge and policy development cases is of particular interest in light 
of the widening climate change science-policy gap, whilst efficient international policy 
and legal regimes have been built up for tackling the acidification and ozone depleting 
phenomena. Concerning the global climate policy regime, the consideration of its 
progress covers the time period since the early 1970s by 2015 when its most recent 
building block was adopted.  
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"Let us suppose that the climate changes by one degree during a century,  
which anyway could be considered as a tremendous change,  
but nowadays would we be able to detect such a change?" (Róna, 1909) 
"The globally averaged combined land and ocean surface temperature data  
as calculated by a linear trend, show a warming of 0.85 [0.65 to 1.06] °C,  
over the period 1880 to 2012." (IPCC, 2013–2014) 
                                                 
1 This paper is the extended and updated version of the author’s presentation at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.  
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1. Introduction 
Phases. Various factors were leading to the almost simultaneous 
intensification of the scientific research activities and the first general 
international policy reflections by the late 1970s on emerging large-scale 
atmospheric hazards, namely, the acidification, the ozone layer depletion, and 
the climate change problems. The formulation of the evidence-based hypotheses 
on their anthropogenic drivers, sources of the atmospheric emissions, and 
possible implications was relatively shortly followed by ascertaining the cause-
effect relations and the adoption of increasingly rigorous international 
agreements only for the acidification and ozone depletion problems. It has 
happened differently for the climate change issue. In general, the earlier 
chronologies of these scientific and policy-making processes were segmented 
and separately analyzed from different perspectives (e.g., in the case of 
acidification by Levy, 1995; the ozone layer policy history by Morrisette, 1989; 
the development of climate change policy regime by Gupta, 1997 and Bodansky, 
2001). The parallel and partially interlinked science-driven policy-making for 
these three atmospheric problems is studied in this paper through the following 
phases: (i) the "inception phase" by the late 1970s associated with the detection 
of these hazards, the scientific search for their cause-effect relations, and the 
initial political reactions; (ii) the verification and the "international policy setup 
phase" by about the turn of the 20th century, which is characterized by reaching 
much higher confidence level in the attribution of these hazardous phenomena to 
certain anthropogenic factors affecting the natural mechanisms and also by the 
development of the relevant international policy regimes; and (iii) the following 
"divergent phase", when the effective solution of the acidification and ozone 
layer hazards was already on track, meanwhile the science-policy gap was 
widening for the global climate change problem. The "inception phase" is 
actually coincides with the birth of a new and prosperous branch of atmospheric 
sciences, namely the air chemistry (Mészáros, 1981), which is inter alia 
dedicated to the subjects of those atmospheric processes, the interrelated 
science-policy aspects of which are considered in this paper. More generally, the 
evolution of the international environmental cooperation and the adoption of 
numerous multilateral agreements were closely linked to the progress in 
environmental science in its entirety, the "scientization" as it was called by 
Brauch and Sprong (2011), and to the changes on the global political scene in 
the second half of the 20th century (Clark et al., 2001; Faragó, 2006).  
Precedents. The policy-setting cases for acidification and ozone depletion 
served in some degree as precedents during the early period of the elaboration of 
the international mechanisms for tackling global climate change. This effect was 
profoundly justified because of some similarities in the socio-economic drivers, 
the applicability of the general principles of international environmental 
cooperation, the most typical response options (abatement/mitigation policies), 
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and the specific situations of the various country groups. But, it turned out rather 
soon, there were considerably distinct aspects of the climate change 
policymaking that could not be overcome at such a pace, as it occurred for the 
two other environmental issues. These aspects stem from the complexity of the 
climate system per se, and also from the multiplicity, particular technology 
aspects, and the inertia of those economic sectors, which contribute to the 
escalation of this global problem. Therefore, the two above-mentioned 
precedential policy processes could have productive effects (directly or 
indirectly) only for a while on development of the international climate policy 
architecture. In course of time, this diversion became even more apparent as the 
science-policy gap was rapidly widening in terms of the improved scientific 
knowledge and the increasingly inadequate level of the overall climate policy 
responses. 
The beginning. The human-induced climate change hazard was 
hypothesized and the acidifying air pollution problem was already noticed well 
before the middle of the previous century. Notably, the possibility of global 
warming caused by fossil fuel combustion was raised at the end of the 19th 
century (by Arrhenius in 1896 and by Chamberlain in 1899). Based on a limited 
set of surface temperature data series and information on "artificial production 
of carbon dioxide" from fossil fuel combustion available that time, Callendar 
(1938) asserted that global warming had begun and provided a draft assessment 
for its rate. In terms of the acidifying air pollutants, the harmful effects of 
emissions from a Canadian metal smelter on the neighboring areas of the USA 
can be mentioned as an early case of such a transboundary pollution. These 
effects were observed from the 1920s and resulted in an international conflict 
between the two countries. The conflict was settled by an arbitration procedure 
without any deep theoretical analysis of the pollution propagation, and the 
decision simply referred to the "injury by fumes in or to the territory of another 
state (..), when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established 
by clear and convincing evidence" (UN, 2006). As a matter of fact, these 
environmental hazards together with the ozone layer problem became prevalent 
several decades later, when rapidly increasing attention was paid to them by the 
scientific community, their genuine mechanisms could be discovered, and the 
first concrete recommendations were formulated for their mitigation. That is 
why we focus on the parallelism and certain similarities of these scientific and 
policy-making processes from the mid-20th century.  
Drivers. Before turning to the above-mentioned phases of detection and 
management of these atmospheric problems, some of those common socio-
economic drivers are highlighted, because of which these hazards started to 
manifest themselves at a quick pace in the post-WW2 era, and in turn, the late 
1960s and early 1970s marked the beginning of more focused scientific research 
nearly simultaneously in these environmental issues and the subsequent initial 
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international political reactions. The post-war economic recovery followed by an 
economic boom in the OECD (formerly OEEC) countries, the rapid 
reconstruction and development in Eastern Europe from the 1950s, and the 
socio-economic changes in many developing countries went together with 
growing demand for natural resources and increased pollution in very diverse 
forms. These environmental pressures were significantly enhanced by the global 
population explosion and changing consumption patterns. The growth in the key 
economic sectors (energy, transport, agriculture, such industrial activities as 
metallurgy, chemical industry, etc.) was inadvertently leading to the 
intensification of large-scale atmospheric and other environmental problems 
(water pollution, loss of biological diversity, deforestation, chemical hazards, 
waste streams). Moreover, there are rather evident reasons that explain why 
these three atmospheric hazards were drawing increased attention with almost 
the same time lag, namely, the time period needed by these accumulating 
environmental pressures for exceeding some critical thresholds. Of course, other 
factors were also essential in this regard, like the fast development of 
environmental monitoring technics, systems and networks, methodologies, 
numerical models, and the international scientific cooperation.  
2. Simultaneous knowledge development on emerging atmospheric hazards 
and the initial policy reactions  
"The combustion of coal, oil, and gas (..) results in the discharge into the air of sulphur dioxide,  
carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, oxides of nitrogen (..) Little is known, e.g., of what happens  
to our most common pollutant, SO2, once it has been discharged into the atmosphere." (PSAC, 1965) 
 
"It is recommended that in establishing standards for pollutants of international significance, Governments  
take into account the relevant standards proposed by competent international organizations (..) in planning  
and carrying out control programmes for pollutants distributed beyond the national jurisdiction." (UNCHE, 1972) 
 
The massive atmospheric emission of disparate pollutants from human activities 
since the mid-20th century have triggered the increased interest of the research 
community to see whether these environmental pressures would lead to 
extensive adverse effects. Besides revitalizing some earlier conceptions or 
developing new ones in this regard, it was clear that first of all, sound 
environmental observations were necessary for reliable scientific investigations 
and conclusions. The International Geophysical Year (IGY) in 1957–58 offered 
a good opportunity to launch regular and internationally standardized 
environmental measurements. The data series from these measurements, the 
assessments of sources and volumes of airborne emissions, and the clarification 
of the relevant biogeochemical cycles greatly contributed to knowledge 
development concerning climate change, acidification, and ozone layer depletion 
by the late 1970s (i.e., during the above mentioned "inception phase"). As a 
consequence, these and some other emerging environmental hazards were 
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acknowledged by policymakers, and the initial coordinated responses were 
agreed upon at their international meetings in 1972 (Stockholm) and 1975 
(Helsinki). In this context, the atmosphere plays a particularly important role: 
"air pollutants move quickly and cover greater distances than do pollutants in 
watercourses or the marine environment. The atmosphere is in fact the planet’s 
largest single shared resource" (Kiss and Shelton, 2007).  
2.1. Systematic observations and initial findings 
Observing atmospheric CO2 changes. The hypothesis on the possibility of 
human-induced climate change could be better tested from the mid-20th century, 
when the after-war economy boost and industrial development resulted inter alia 
in rapidly growing fossil fuel based energy production. Revelle and Suess (1957) 
described it as a dangerous process and insisted on having more precise 
measurements and assessments: "Present data on the total amount of CO2 in the 
atmosphere, on the rates and mechanisms of CO2 exchange between the sea and 
the air (..) are insufficient to give an accurate base line for measurement of 
future changes in atmospheric CO2. An opportunity exists during the 
International Geophysical Year to obtain much of the necessary information." 
As a follow-up, the rate of increase of the anthropogenic CO2 emissions and 
atmospheric concentrations was re-assessed in 1958 (Callendar, 1958; Bolin and 
Eriksson, 1958), and accurate measurements of the atmospheric CO2 started at 
the Mauna Loa Observatory in the same year. It was confirmed soon that this 
value had annually a "small but persistent increase" (Keeling, 1960). Based on 
that discovery, the USA President’s Scientific Advisory Committee formulated 
its opinion that the changing chemical composition of the atmosphere may lead 
to a significant change of the climate already by the end of that century (PSAC, 
1965).  
Concerns about the SO2 releases. The same period of time marked the 
increased attention to man-made atmospheric discharges of various pollutants, 
their transport and deposition, with a particular focus on the sulfur cycle 
(Eriksson, 1963). Similarly to the case of the carbon-dioxide, it became evident 
that for the sake of more accurate assessments, first of all systematic monitoring 
was necessary. The European Air Chemistry Network (EACN) was established 
in the middle of 1950s and substantially extended during the IGY. This issue 
was also raised on the other side of the Atlantic (PSAC, 1965): "The combustion 
of coal, oil, and gas in our homes, vehicles, and factories results in the discharge 
into the air of sulphur dioxide, carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, oxides of 
nitrogen, and partially burned hydrocarbons. (..) Many of these pollutants 
released unintentionally or as a by-product are long-lasting, come from a 
multitude of sources, and are subject to transportation over great distances in air, 
water, or living organisms. All three characteristics make them very difficult to 
control. (..) The problem of air pollution calls for much research."  
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Systematic observations of O3. It is noteworthy that the Global Ozone 
Observing System also started its operation in 1957 in the framework of the IGY 
(WMO, 2014). Initially it was based on an existing international monitoring 
network; afterwards, it was gradually extended, internationally standardized, and 
two decades later complemented with satellite measurements. Initially, the 
measurements were made from the ground, however, their series did not show 
any considerable trends by the 1970s.  
2.2. Evidence-based identification of cause-effect relations  
CO2 emissions. The growing observational network, the Global Atmospheric 
Research Programme (GARP) from 1967, and the first simple global climate 
models (developed by Manabe and Wetherald in 1967, by Budyko in 1969, and 
by Sellers also in 1969) provided more information on the global climate 
system. It made possible better (conditional) assessments of the potential 
consequences of the steadily increasing CO2 releases from fossil fuel 
combustion together with other greenhouse gas emissions. These developments 
were reflected in the scientific communication already in the early 1970s. 
According to Keeling (1970), the increasing human population in the 21th 
century "along with their other troubles, may also face the threat of climatic 
change brought about by an uncontrolled increase in atmospheric CO2 from 
fossil fuels." Bolin and Bischof (1970) have derived estimates of the atmospheric 
CO2 for the forthcoming decades by accepting certain assumptions, for instance 
on further rates of global fossil fuel combustion. It is remarkable that their 
estimate was 371–378 ppm for the year 2000, which proved to be very close to 
the factual value of 370 ppm obtained at Mauna Loa Observatory as the annual 
average for 2000 with its peak monthly value of 372 ppm in May that year.  
SO2 emissions. Those years became also memorable for understanding the 
transboundary "sulfur problem". The evidence-based hypothesis on the long-
range transmission of airborne acidifying pollutants was raised by Odén (1968) 
by studying the series of precipitation chemistry measurements from the EACN. 
Systematic analyses by a couple of North-European researchers (supported by 
the Scandinavian Council for Applied Research) offered more arguments on this 
matter and resulted in setting up the international Cooperative Technical 
Programme to Measure the Long Range Transport of Air Pollutants by the 
OECD in April 1972 (OECD, 1977). These efforts were assisted by the 
establishment of the Background Air Pollution Monitoring System (BAPMoN) 
in 1970 and by a multi-annual programme on the Biogeochemical Cycles under 
the aegis of the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE) 
of the ICSU (Svensson and Soderlund, 1976). The tentative observational data 
and analytic studies confirmed the assumption on the long-range transport of 
those pollutants. Similarly to the CO2 releases, the increasing fossil fuel 
combustion was primarily "blamed" for these emissions and their harmful 
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effects on ecosystems. Based on these studies, the Swedish experts decided to 
present this issue as a case study to the UN Conference on Human Environment 
to be held in June 1972 (Bolin et al., 1971, 1972). Because of substantial 
scientific uncertainties and other reasons, representatives of a few key Western 
European emitters strongly denied the idea of the long-range atmospheric 
transmission of these pollutants (i.e., the possibility that pollutants from their 
sources can reach Scandinavian regions).  
CFC emissions. The potentially harmful human effects on the stratospheric 
ozone layer have also piqued the interest of the research community just in the 
same time period. This quasi-coincidence was obviously triggered by the socio-
economic drivers mentioned above (economic growth, technological progress, 
new production and consumption patterns, etc.). The recognition of the 
possibility of endangering the ozone layer did not stem from actual observations, 
but from theoretical studies. In the early 1970s, two specific human activities 
were identified as those, which can directly interfere with natural factors in 
controlling the ozone content in the lower stratosphere. Crutzen (1970) revealed 
that the nitrogen oxides emitted from the surface may influence the ozone 
photochemistry in the stratosphere, but the sources of these nitrous oxides 
remained unclear, that is, where those originate from (in respective volumes) 
and how they reach high-level altitudes. In retrospect, it seems so evident that 
the stratospheric supersonic transport aircrafts (SST) were named as important 
anthropogenic causes of this problem, since they directly released nitrogen 
oxides up there (Johnston, 1971). One year later it turned out that the NASA’s 
space shuttle operations using solid rocket boosters of the Space Transportation 
Systems (STS) caused high amount of hydrogen chloride emissions in the 
stratosphere that might also contribute to the ozone destruction (Stolarski and 
Cicerone, 1974). Assumptions on the SST and STS as the main dangers for the 
ozone layer did not prove valid (the overall amounts of these emissions could 
not explain an extensive ozone depletion); nevertheless, those ideas were 
catalyzing very intense scientific research in this area. The attention was turned 
to the halocarbons when their very stable chemical property, persistence, and 
accumulation in the atmosphere was discovered (Lovelock et al., 1973). The 
invention of chloroflourocarbons resulted in a breakthrough, inter alia, in the 
refrigerator industry and a boost of the production of these halocarbons from the 
1950s. It was a crucial milestone in the scientific recognition, when Molina and 
Rowland (1974) demonstrated that these synthetic chemical compounds 
(notably, CFCl3 and CF2CL2, i.e., CFC-11 and CFC-12) are responsible for the 
increasing volumes of chlorine in the stratosphere and in turn, for the ozone 
depletion. They also had a clear argument for the still missing detection of the 
"thinning" of the ozone layer by these halocarbons: it could not be "immediately 
felt after their introduction at ground level because of the delay required for 
upward diffusion up to and above 25 km."  
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2.3. First international policy reactions 
Other preconditions. Therefore, the period of the late 1960s and early 
1970s was crucial in the identification of the human causes for all the three 
large-scale atmospheric hazards, as it was indicated above together with 
demonstrating some common factors behind these processes and the parallelism 
of these discoveries. In spite of the considerable scientific uncertainties, the first 
general policy responses were already agreed upon internationally during those 
years. Besides the strengthened environmental observing systems and the 
increased concerns of the scientific community over the rapidly growing 
environmental pressures from different human activities, there was another 
important precondition for that progress, notably, the favourable geopolitical 
situation or more specifically, the global political atmosphere of the détente 
(Clark et al., 2001; Faragó, 2006). This condition was essential in general for 
the initiation of international deliberations on the increasing environmental risks 
and eventually, for achieving consensus on the basic principles of cooperation 
and the initial concerted actions. The general tone was set by a UN resolution 
(UNGA, 1968), according to which: the General Assembly decided to convene 
the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) in 1972, 
in particular because of "the continuing and accelerating impairment of the 
quality of the human environment caused by such factors as air and water 
pollution (..), which are accentuated by rapidly increasing population and 
accelerating urbanization". Among the various intensifying environmental 
problems (including those associated with the extraction of natural resources, 
chemical pollution, etc.), special attention was paid to the atmosphere-related 
ones, since primarily these could induce dangerous large-scale transboundary or 
even global ecological and socio-economic impacts.  
UNCHE outcomes. Because of conflicting political and economic interests 
of various country groups (in Europe and also between the developed and 
developing countries) and the still rather limited scientific knowledge on the 
environmental issues concerned, the preparation of the UNCHE and its outcome 
documents was exceptionally complicated (Engfeldt, 2009). Eventually, that 
event could be considered as the first historical milestone in global 
environmental cooperation. The most important provisions of the adopted 
documents in relation to the subject of this study clearly demonstrate that the 
initial international political reflections were quite similar and rather cautious in 
terms of the anthropogenic factors of these large-scale atmospheric hazards 
(UNCHE, 1972). First of all, it was agreed that the relevant monitoring systems 
should be further developed, notably by setting up a global network of stations 
"for monitoring properties and constituents of the atmosphere on a regional basis 
and especially changes in the distribution and concentration of contaminants" 
(recommendation 79/b), and more specifically, by properly monitoring the 
environmental effects of energy use and production, including "the 
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environmental levels resulting from emission of carbon dioxide, sulphur 
dioxide, oxidants, nitrogen oxides (NOx), heat and particulates, as well as those 
from releases of oil and radioactivity" (r. 57/a). (The "oxidants" in this listing, 
supposedly was an implicit compromise wording already referring to ozone.) 
Reference was also made to the importance of the internationally coordinated 
research programmes to learn more on the causes and the possible impacts of 
air pollution and climate change (r. 57/b, r. 79/d) and to understand better "the 
causes of climatic changes whether these causes are natural or the result of man's 
activities" (r. 79/d). Beyond that, the very general principles and objectives were 
also agreed on the mitigation policies, which aim "to minimize the release to the 
environment of toxic or dangerous substances" (r. 71), to plan and carry out 
"control programmes for pollutants distributed beyond the national jurisdiction" 
(r. 72), and to bear "the responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or 
of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction" (principle 21). The adoption 
of the recommendations and principles by the conference can be considered as 
the beginning of the modern era of international environmental cooperation 
marked by strengthened science-policy links and numerous multilateral 
agreements: "The Stockholm Conference had immense value in drawing attention 
to the problem of environmental deterioration and methods to prevent or remedy 
it. The Conference was global both in its planetary conception of the 
environment, and in its view of institutional structures and world policies." (Kiss 
and Sheltin, 2007)  
Sceptics. The histories of the three atmospheric topics considered here had 
also something else in common in those years, namely, the appearance of 
counter-positions and sceptical views by rejecting with counter-arguments or by 
simply denying the possibility of significant human influence on the natural 
processes in question. In general, scepticism in natural science is an important 
methodological approach; however, in these cases besides questioning the 
validity of the attribution of these hazards at least partially to some human 
activities and referring to differing scientific arguments, the denial of the 
hypotheses was sometimes seemingly backed by particular economic interests. 
For the acidification and ozone depletion problems, such a reminder might be 
pertinent in view of the recurrent debates on degrees of certainty and confidence 
in the context of anthropogenic climate change and the justification of the 
precautionary approach in policymaking. When in the early 1970s the 
hypothesis on the transboundary air pollution causing acidification in the North 
European countries was reaffirmed by Scandinavian experts, the possibility of 
such long-range transport was refused by many West European representatives, 
as recollected by Seip (2001): "British and Norwegian authorities came in 
conflict on the acid rain issue particularly since Great Britain was the largest 
contributor of acidifying deposition in Norway". Even after that the above-
referred OECD project resulted in convincing observational information on this 
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issue and the need for international regulation was raised in 1978, the initiative 
to draw up a convention on the reduction of sulphur dioxide emissions was 
"battered by delegations of the EEC countries, especially by France, the United 
Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. In the course of the discussion, 
the United Kingdom’s delegation expressed unequivocal doubt about the 
validity of the hypothesis of the transboundary character of acid rain" (UNECE, 
2004b). Similarly, in the early 1970s, there were strong opponents of the SST 
and STS theories either by raising clear-cut and correct scientific thoughts (e.g., 
about negligible amounts of NOx emissions by SST and STS) or clearly 
representing some economic interests (in connection to the supersonic transport 
airplanes by the "Brussels Group" as documented by Engfeldt, 2009 and Hamer, 
2002). After 1974, the scientifically much more established discovery of the 
ozone-depleting potential of CFCs was heavily challenged by the concerned 
industry groups: "both manufacturers and users of CFCs opposed any effort to 
regulate CFCs in aerosol spray cans. They questioned the validity of the theory, 
pointing out the uncertainties and noting the lack of supporting evidence" 
(Morrisette, 1989). Concerning the global climate change hazard, in the 1960s 
and early 1970s, both the theories on forthcoming global cooling (the beginning 
of a new glacial period) and on human induced global warming were promoted 
and communicated in parallel. This course has changed considerably when the 
scientific assumptions, evidences, and results were critically assessed in 1979 by 
the (first) World Climate Conference and by the Ad Hoc Study Group on Carbon 
Dioxide and Climate in the USA. The declaration of the Conference (WMO, 
1979) and the report of the Group (Charney et al., 1979) already focused on the 
global warming scenarios caused by increasing atmospheric CO2 amounts from 
fossil fuel combustion, deforestation, and land use change. The "sceptical era" 
was generally overcome by about the late 1980s for the acidification and ozone 
depletion problems, but it has been prolonged for the climate change hazard for 
some understandable reasons.  
The Helsinki process. The focus on the environmental problems was 
strengthened in the broad context of international cooperation and security. 
Formally, the Helsinki process leading to the 1975 Conference on Security and 
Co-Operation in Europe (CSCE) was a pan-European initiative yet of global 
significance. The negotiations have culminated in the adoption of the Final Act 
in 1975, which incorporated a chapter dedicated to the enhancement of 
environmental cooperation. This chapter of the document was not only 
reconfirming the most essential provisions of the UNCHE (e.g., the 
responsibility for transboundary and global environmental degradation, 
importance of preventive measures for the avoidance of environmental damages, 
development of environmental monitoring networks), but it stated more 
concretely the necessary steps regarding the acidification and the climate change 
problems. Obviously, the more definite formulation was made possible by the 
specific regional dimension of the CSCE (devoted to the East-West relations and 
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the pan-European cooperation). In terms of these two atmospheric issues, there 
were already affirmative references to the transboundary pollution and to the 
anthropogenic factors (as compared to the "cautious" recommendations by the 
UNCHE). Accordingly, the participating States agreed (i) to develop an 
international programme for the monitoring and evaluation of the long-range 
transport of air pollutants, starting with sulphur dioxide and with possible 
extension to other pollutants; for the "desulphurization of fossil fuels and 
exhaust gases, pollution control of heavy metals, particles, aerosols, nitrogen 
oxides, in particular those emitted by transport, power stations, and other 
industrial plants; systems and methods of observation and control of air 
pollution and its effects, including long-range transport of air pollutants" and 
also (ii) to study the changes in climate "under the impact of both natural factors 
and human activities" (CSCE, 1975). The ozone layer issue also became a 
delicate topic during the preparations for the CSCE, as the discovery of the 
ozone-destroying effect of the CFCs was published in June 1974 (Molina and 
Rowland, 1974), and already in December that year, the U.S. House of 
Representatives held a hearing on this matter. Presumably, the U.S. 
representatives raised this theme during the international expert meeting in Oslo 
in December 1974 (US-DoS, 1974), where the proposals for the environmental 
chapter were discussed for the CSCE.  
Consequently, in the late 1960s and early 1970s besides some other 
environmental problems, not only the scientific awareness and communication 
were significantly strengthening more or less simultaneously for the three 
rapidly emerging atmospheric hazards, but already these issues were addressed 
internationally by the policymakers. These initial policy recommendations 
agreed upon at the high-level meetings in 1972 and 1975 concentrated on the 
development of the environmental monitoring systems and the promotion of the 
international research cooperation in these areas in order to better understand the 
processes, their natural and anthropogenic drivers, the potential adverse impacts. 
Moreover, the general need for controlling the emissions of the relevant 
pollutants was also indicated but without any concreteness and targets. Already 
a few years later, the specific policy-planning started and some very concrete 
first measures were taken: a World Plan of Action on the Ozone Layer was 
adopted in 1977 by the UNEP; between 1977 and 1979 the non-essential use of 
CFCs were banned in the USA, Canada, Norway, and Sweden; the negotiations 
on controlling transboundary air pollution began at the end of 1978 under the 
UNECE auspices; and some policy-related aspects were already raised in 
connection with different climate change scenarios at a conference held in 1978 
at IIASA.  
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3. Setting up the international response policy regimes  
(On the policy regime of the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution:) "As a precedent,  
the regime has contributed to the adoption of global treaties and rules on air pollution." (Byrne, 2015) 
"The Montreal Protocol (..) offers the precedent of international negotiation  
and agreement on global environmental problems." (Morrisette, 1989) 
From the late 1970s, the research activities were intensified, the cause-effect 
relations were much better identified, the basic international mechanisms and 
response policies were formulated and gradually advanced for all the three large-
scale atmospheric issues. The international policy framework established for the 
acidification and ozone layer problems served to some extent as precedents for 
the climate change negotiations. In the following, several key precedential 
components of both the pan-European acid rain policy regime and the global 
policy architecture for the ozone layer problem are highlighted; then the 
analogous features and building blocks of the international climate change 
policy settings are presented in order to demonstrate (mutatis mutandis) the "re-
use" of the previously agreed and proved procedures.  
3.1. Precedent-setting regional agreements  
to combat transboundary acidifying pollution  
Reaffirming the acidification hazard. The long-range transport of the 
acidifying pollutants was profoundly ascertained in the late 1970s as much more 
observational data and improved numeric models became available. In this 
regard, the European Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (EMEP) played an 
important role owing to the systematic collection and provision of standardized 
atmospheric chemistry data from 1977 onward. The "acid rain" problem started 
to receive higher political attention internationally when the report of the above 
mentioned OECD programme was published in 1977 with the following 
conclusions (OECD, 1977): "Man-made emissions of sulphur dioxide in Europe 
are derived mainly from combustion of sulphur-containing coal and fuel oil. (..) 
The programme has confirmed that sulphur compounds do travel long distances 
(..) in the atmosphere and has shown that the air quality in any one European 
country is measurably affected by emissions from other European countries." 
This was an important catalyst to the international policy negotiations, but the 
real push for general acceptance of the need for urgent abatement measures was 
that when the long-range atmospheric transport of pollutants and the acid rains 
generated by them were made responsible for the extensive forest degradation in 
Germany (Hinrichsen, 1983). Ulrich (1983) categorically stated that the 
"emissions of strong acid formers like SO2 and NOx leads to the poisoning of the 
ecosphere (..) The only environmental factor for forest which has been changed 
is the ‘chemical climate’ by air pollution. There is therefore no doubt that this 
change is the driving force for a development in the ecosphere which is 
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characterized not only by tree and forest die-back, but also by the acidification 
of waters and by disappearance of species at an increasing rate. The data about 
load, carrying capacity and visible damage are more than enough to claim a 
rapid and considerable reduction of air pollution to avoid a possible ecological 
catastrophe". It was followed by a significant expansion of the atmospheric 
chemistry observational network, refined assessments of sulphur emissions from 
different sources, and further development of the transport models, which 
altogether produced much clearer information on the widespread scale of this 
pollution problem, and on its anthropogenic factors (Mylona, 1993). The stages 
of science development and its influence on strengthening the acid rain policy 
regime are presented in detail by Levy (1995), Menz and Seip (2004), and also in 
the analytic review of the 25 years of the Convention on Long-range 
Transboundary Air Pollution (UNECE, 2004b). These studies demonstrated that 
the international policy-making from the 1980s closely followed and adequately 
reflected the advancement of "acidification science" with the adoption of 
increasingly ambitious targets and emissions reduction commitments for all 
relevant pollutants in order to minimize their harmful effects.  
The acid rain policy regime. The Helsinki conference (1975) and the 
conclusion of the OECD programme on the Long Range Transport of Air 
Pollutants (OECD, 1977) were followed by launching in 1978 the negotiations 
on a pan-European agreement on transboundary pollution. Both the basic 
scientific and political prerequisites existed for that motion. As regards the 
latter, the visit of G. H. Brundtland, the Norwegian prime-minister to Moscow in 
1978 and the bilateral consent on the importance of this matter proved to be one 
of the most significant political factors for the start of the multilateral 
negotiations. Eventually, the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution (CLRTAP) was adopted in Geneva in November 1979 and afterwards, 
in the succeeding two decades, it was complemented with a series of protocols 
on monitoring, on abatement of sulfur and nitrogen emissions, and on reduction 
of the adverse impacts. The international acid rain policy regime comprises of 
the provisions of this set of legal instruments, the agreed targets and policies 
together with the means of implementation introduced by a series of the Parties’ 
decisions. We restrict our focus to the acidifying air pollutants (AAPs), 
however, from the early 1990s, this pan-European cooperation was broadened to 
cope more generally with transboundary air pollution, including abatement 
policies for VOCs, heavy metals, and POPs, and taking into account the harmful 
"multi-effects" of all these pollutants.  
The framework agreement. The 1979 convention was a framework type 
legal instrument, as it was only demonstrating the general political consensus on 
the environmental risk caused by air-borne pollutants, however, without 
determining any particular obligations for the Parties on controlling the 
emissions of the AAPs. One reason for that was the still considerable level of 
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uncertainties, so that implicitly, a precautionary approach was adopted by 
"recognizing the existence of possible adverse effects, in the short and long 
term, of air pollution including transboundary air pollution" (UNECE, 1979). 
Thanks to rapid verification of the transboundary movement of these pollutants 
and their adverse impacts, the precautionary approach was soon replaced by 
very concrete preventive measures in the first sulphur protocol in 1985, as the 
Parties already expressed their concern "that the present emissions of air 
pollutants are causing widespread damage" (UNECE, 2004a). Afterwards, more 
stringent legally binding emission reduction obligations were included in a 
series of subsequent protocols. It has meant a stepwise or gradual strengthening 
of the targets and obligations, which ultimately resulted in the very effective 
management of this environmental problem.  
Quantified emissions control commitments were formulated by means of 
defining the reference levels (base years) and the limitation or reduction targets 
(UNECE, 2004a): in 1985 the 30% emission reduction for sulphur by 1993 
compared to its 1980 level; in 1988 the stabilization of the NOx emissions or 
transboundary fluxes generally by 1994 at the level of 1987; more ambitious 
reduction levels in the second sulphur protocol in 1994. Eventually, the 1999 
Gothenburg protocol took into account the combined adverse effects and set 
even more stringent reduction targets for all relevant pollutants: 65% for SO2, 
44% for NOx, 17% for NH3 by 2010 below their 1990 emission levels. (This 
protocol was further amended later.)  
Some differentiation was demanded by the countries as the required level of 
emissions reduction was gradually raised, so that the countries’ different 
situations could be acknowledged in relation to: the responsibility for and 
contribution to this common environmental problem; the adverse effects; the 
abatement costs; and/or their capabilities to control these emissions. Such a 
differentiation of the commitments was introduced on a country-by-country 
basis when more ambitious reduction targets for sulphur were agreed in 1994, 
and also when the comprehensive "multi-pollutant and multi-effect" protocol 
was adopted in 1999 (UNECE, 2004a). According to this last protocol, country-
specific reduction commitments were set for sulphur, nitrogen oxides, and 
ammonia (and also for VOCs).  
Joint implementation was permitted by the 1994 protocol, according to 
which two or more Parties could jointly fulfil their emissions reduction 
commitments (if it seemed to lead to cost savings). As a matter of fact, the use 
of this option would actually mean emission trading between the Parties in such 
a way that the "host Party" undertake additional reductions to be accounted for 
the "donor Party", which pays for those "transferred" emission units, but not 
directly for any project resulting in those extra emission reductions. In reality, 
this instrument was never used, as the Parties could not agree on the specific 
conditions and rules of its application.  
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The active science-policy interaction was essential for the development of 
proper policies and mechanisms in this international cooperation. A close relation 
was established between the convention-related organs (primarily, the main 
governing organization, i.e., the Executive Body) and those international 
institutions (the Steering Body of the EMEP, Meteorological Synthetizing Centres), 
which regularly delivered information to the negotiators on the new observational 
and research results. Moreover, the Parties set up their own permanent working 
groups with the mandate to evaluate the scientific and technological developments, 
and if necessary, to recommend additional measures (Working Groups on 
Strategies, on Effects and on Abatement Techniques).  
Enforcement. At last, we refer to the compliance mechanism that included 
procedures and institutional arrangements (Implementation Committee), which 
were adopted within the 1994 and 1999 protocols and aimed at reviewing the 
fulfilment of commitments and supporting the Parties to comply with them. It 
was a soft enforcement instrument, as the emphasis was on providing assistance 
to the Parties concerned, and actually, no sanctions could be proposed at all 
against a Party, which was found in non-compliance even with the emissions 
control obligations under the CLRTAP and its protocols.  
3.2. The ozone layer policy regime  
as a global precedent for the climate policy mechanisms 
Ozone science development. Contrary to the acidification problem, the 
scientific recognition of the ozone layer depletion hazard did not start with the 
actual observation of this dangerous phenomenon, but with the scientific 
cogitation in early 1970s about those substances, their anthropogenic sources 
and chemical reactions which could influence the stratospheric ozone. The 
potential risk of modification of the ozone layer by human activities was 
reconfirmed by reports (published by WMO, UNEP, U.S. NAS), which 
summarized the growing body of scientific results on this matter, and starting 
from 1977, these triggered the decisions to ban or at least to reduce the "non-
essential use" of the CFCs in some countries. The UNEP undertook the 
international coordination from 1977 based on the "World Plan of Action for the 
Ozone Layer", and in 1981, the decision was made to begin drafting a global 
convention to protect the ozone layer (Morrisette, 1989). Understandably, 
concrete commitments could be adopted only after 1984, when the stratospheric 
ozone hole above the Antarctica was discovered and the assumptions on the role 
of CFCs in the ozone destruction were confirmed (Farman et al., 1985). The 
thorough analysis of various ozone depleting substances (ODS), their chemical 
mechanisms, varying status of the ozone layer, and the adverse impacts of its 
depletion, as well as, the technological search for the "ozone friendly" chemical 
compounds were leading to gradual strengthening of international policy 
responses. Below, we turn only to some of those key elements of this 
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international policy regime, which directly or indirectly served as precedents for 
the climate policy negotiations and their outcomes. A few of these elements 
somehow replicate those instruments at global level which were developed for 
the pan-European acid rain policy regime, whilst others were specifically 
introduced, for instance, to facilitate effective participation of the developing 
countries in the common endeavour to cope with this global hazard.  
The gradual approach to the ozone layer depletion problem was similar to 
that for the acidification, namely this global issue was also addressed by the 
international community in a stepwise manner starting with a framework type 
convention (UNEP, 1985), which was followed by a protocol (UNEP, 1987) and 
a series a subsequent amendments and adjustments. Extension of the list of the 
controlled substances and setting new reduction targets occurred due to 
advancement in ozone science and technology (development of the substituting 
chemical compounds). The 1985 Convention emphasized only the importance of 
the precautionary measures and accordingly did not include any concrete 
immediate quantified objectives, but contained only a future oriented provision: 
"The Parties shall take appropriate measures (..) to protect human health and the 
environment against adverse effects resulting or likely to result from human 
activities which modify or are likely to modify the ozone layer" and named those 
hazardous substances which at that stage were "thought to have the potential to 
modify the chemical and physical properties of the ozone layer". As the discovery 
of the ozone hole was communicated shortly after concluding the convention, 
the negotiations were speeded up, and the 1987 Montreal Protocol (MP) already 
determined quantified reduction targets for the production of some ODS. The 
subsequent amendments and adjustments (UNEP, 2012) substantially extended 
the list of controlled substances and set more stringent reduction obligations for 
the Parties.  
The basic commitments were formulated as required quantified reduction 
rates to be reached by some deadlines compared to a reference level (1986). In the 
1987 Montreal Protocol, the longest term target was defined for 1999 and it aimed 
at a 50% reduction for the most "prominent" substances (five types of CFCs) by 
that year and beyond. For other substances (halons), a stabilization obligation was 
accepted, namely, the requirement that their national production volume should not 
exceed the reference level. In response to the increasing awareness of the ozone 
layer thinning danger and the ozone depleting potential of those substances, already 
in 1990, the deadlines for the 50% reduction target were moved backward to 1995, 
and it was agreed to fully phase-out the use of these synthetic chemical compounds 
from 2000. The further amendments and adjustments by 1999 did not only extend 
the lists of the substances, tightened the deadlines, and increased the reduction rates 
(ultimately referring to a consumption and production level that "does not exceed 
zero"), but also for many ODS even banned import from and export to the countries 
which were not Parties to the MP.  
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Some differentiation in terms of the controlling commitments were agreed 
already in 1987 in favour of the developing countries with relatively low level 
per capita ODS consumption. With this provision, the apparently less 
responsibility for the ozone depletion hazard and also the developmental needs 
of these countries were recognized. This group of countries became entitled for 
a ten years delay for the compliance with some of the Protocol’s key obligations. 
The subsequent amendments and adjustments regularly turned back to and 
refined the terms of this differentiation.  
Trading with production quotas and joint implementation as optional 
complementary instruments were defined by the 1987 Montreal Protocol. Under 
specific circumstances, the former one was an option for any two Parties 
according to which those could trade in a portion of production of some ODS, as 
long as the aggregated level of their productions would not exceed the sum of 
production limits set out for those Parties (UNEP, 2012). This opportunity was 
used by Australia and New Zealand in 1997. The joint implementation or joint 
fulfilment mechanism in principle could be applied by a group of countries, such 
as the members of the European Community.  
Science-policy relations were of high significance for this matter, as well, 
especially for evaluation of the effectiveness of the agreed commitments and for 
provision of advices about additional, more ambitious targets, based on the 
advanced knowledge on the ozone depleting mechanisms and abatement 
options. For this purpose, expert panels were established with the mandate to 
provide scientific and technological assessments and proposals (Panels for 
Ozone Scientific Assessment, Environmental Effects Assessment, Technology 
and Economic Assessment).  
Enforcement. A comprehensive procedure was put in operation for the 
evaluation of the occasional non-compliance of the Parties regarding the 
implementation of their commitments under the MP. The elaboration of this 
mechanism began in 1990, it was adopted in 1992, and substantially widened in 
1998 (UNEP, 2012). It included detailed proceedings and an institutional 
component (Implementation Committee). Basically, recommendations were 
made for the Parties which were found in non-compliance with the control or the 
reporting obligations, moreover, financial means could be offered as assistance 
to achieve compliance. Beyond that, in principle, more serious measures could 
also be taken, such as the suspension of the rights of a Party to trade with 
production quotas, however, the use of the sanctions was generally avoided 
(Sarma, 2005).  
A financial instrument was initiated in 1989 by the Parties to the Montreal 
Protocol "to recognize the urgent need to establish international financial and 
other mechanisms to enable developing countries to meet the requirements of 
the present and a future strengthened Protocol, thereby addressing the ozone 
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depletion and related problems" (UNEP, 2012). Its operation started on an 
interim basis in 1990, but already two years later it was made final. This 
Multilateral Fund received financial contributions from the "non-developing 
countries", that is from the developed countries and the "countries with 
economies in transition" (EiTs) with a clear understanding that without such 
an instrument and technological support, the majority of the developing 
countries (DCs) would not be able to reduce and gradually phase out the 
ODS. In 1990, the financial assistance for capacity building was considered 
by the DCs as a condition for implementation of the control measures by 
them. The agreement on financial contributions involved that the Central and 
Eastern European countries (that is the EiTs) also became donors, whilst they 
started to face serious problems to fulfil their own obligations under the MP. 
Ultimately, it was the Global Environment Facility (GEF) that offered some 
financial assistance to these countries for meeting the ODS controlling 
targets.  
A specific condition for entry into force (EiF) of the Protocol is also 
noteworthy, and essentially it was replicated for the international climate change 
policy regime with more or less similar justification. In general, it is 
customary to set a reasonable threshold number of acceding countries that 
should be reached for a multilateral agreement for its coming into force. (In 
this respect, "becoming a Party" in broad sense requires the deposition of the 
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession.) In the case of 
the MP, one more essential condition was added, according to which it would 
enter into force provided that at least eleven such instruments had been 
deposited by countries "representing at least two thirds of 1986 estimated 
global consumption of the controlled substances". Determining such a 
bottom line for the aggregated reduction volume of the ODS consumption by 
those countries guaranteed the effectiveness of the implementation of this 
agreement. It was evident that the objectives of the MP could not be reached 
without the active participation of the "big consumers" of the ODS. Those 
years, the USA and the European Community together were responsible for 
more than half of the global consumption, while the large group of the 
developing countries only for about one seventh of that total amount (UNEP, 
2005).  
3.3. Replication of some precedential features  
in the international climate policy setup 
Policy-relevant climate science: the outset. A new period started in the 
scientific understanding of and the elevated concern over the climate change 
hazard from the late 1970s. What was known and also the remaining 
knowledge gap concerning the cycles of the greenhouse gases (GHGs) and 
the effects of their increasing atmospheric concentrations were summarized 
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inter alia in the Charney report (1979) and at international level, by the (first) 
World Climate Conference (WMO, 1979). According to our timeline 
terminology, the Conference’s declaration properly reflected the end of the 
"inception phase" and the outset of the next phase for ascertaining the validity 
of the earlier assumptions on this complex issue: "Carbon dioxide plays a 
fundamental role in determining the temperature of the earth’s atmosphere, 
and it appears plausible that an increased amount of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere can contribute to a gradual warming of the lower atmosphere, 
especially at high latitudes (..) but the details of the changes are still poorly 
understood". During the following decade, the expanding observational 
systems, the improved global climate models, as well as the synthetization of 
the multidisciplinary research results in the framework of the World Climate 
Programme and the programmes of many international organizations (ICSU, 
UNEP, WMO, IIASA, etc.) substantially contributed to the fast science 
development on climate variability and change (Faragó, 1981, 1991). In the 
second half of the 1980s, a series of international meetings were devoted not 
only to the discussion of the new scientific achievements, but also to the 
possible actions to mitigate this hazard. Experts reviewed the state-of-the-art 
of climate change science at the meetings held in 1985 and 1987 (Villach, 
Bellagio), which were followed by international conferences between 1988 
and 1990 (Toronto, The Hague, Nordwijk), where already scientists and 
policymakers exchanged views on the probable adverse consequences and the 
policy options (Bodansky, 2001).  
Climate change policy regime. The year of 1988 can be seen as the 
actual beginning of construction of the international climate change policy 
regime with several exceptionally important developments: the first proposal 
for a concrete GHG-emissions control target was formulated at the Toronto 
meeting, the IPCC2 was established as the main channel of scientific 
information to the policymaking community, and the UN resolution was 
adopted on the "Protection of global climate for present and future 
generations of mankind" (UNGA, 1988). The findings of the first IPCC report 
in 1990 were essential motivations for the outcomes of the 2nd World 
Climate Conference and also for a further UN resolution at the end of that 
year, which were leading to the international negotiations from 1991 and 
ultimately, to adoption of the global agreement on climate change in 1992. 
The foundations of the policy regime defined by this UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1992) were later on considerably 
complemented by the Kyoto Protocol (KP) in 1997 and by a series of 
decisions enframed in the Marrakesh Accords (MA) passed in 2001 by the 
Conference of the Parties (COP). The Convention was enacted in 1994, the 
Protocol’s entry into force occurred ten years later, after which the terms of a 
                                                 
2 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change  
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new round of negotiations were discussed in 2005 (Montreal) and agreed in 
2007 (Bali Action Plan) on the continuation of the KP for the post-2012 
period and the elaboration of a new global agreement. Eventually, (i) the KP 
was "prolonged" in 2012 by its Doha Amendment (DA) with new emission 
reduction commitments for the industrialized countries (ICs) for the 2013–
2020 period, and (ii) a new universal legal instrument was adopted at the end 
of 2015. The latter one is the Paris Agreement (PA), which is also under the 
UNFCCC likewise the Kyoto Protocol and its Doha Amendment, but the PA 
is elaborated as a complex set of mechanisms and procedures for the post-
2020 period with various general obligations for all Parties. (As a matter of 
fact, the PA established and defined only the "skeleton" of those mechanisms 
and procedures so that the concrete rules of their operation ought to be 
defined in the forthcoming years. Unfortunately, it is also valid for the 
Parties’ concrete commitments: in particular, the PA does not include any 
concrete global and country level emissions control targets with the 
respective deadlines, and such nationally determined targets will be regularly 
determined, updated/upgraded, and communicated later.) Henceforth, we 
devote our attention to some of the substantial components of the 
international climate policy architecture3, which had their precedents in acid 
rain and ozone layer policy regimes (Table 1). Some of these elements 
appeared in other contemporary multilateral legal instruments, however, the 
influence of the policy mechanisms of the two other large-scale atmosphere-
related environmental processes was especially prominent for the climate 
change issue. As the protocols on sulphur and nitrogen emissions were 
finalized in 1985 and 1988, respectively, and the Montreal Protocol on ozone 
layer protection was concluded in 1987, the fresh experiences on 
compromise-settings within those negotiating processes had also their 
reflections on the climate negotiations launched at the beginning of 1991.  
  
                                                 
3 The present discussion of the international climate policy regime takes into account some key components of the Framework Convention, 
the Kyoto Protocol, the Marrakesh Accords, the Doha Amendment, some decisions by the Parties, and the Paris Agreement.  
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Table 1. Evolvement of the international policy regimes since the late 1970s and some of 
their analogous features (introduced by the acid rain and/or ozone layer regimes and 
replicated in the climate change policy settings) 
 Acid rain policy regime Ozone layer policy regime Climate change policy regime 
 
1978- negotiations 
1979: "framework" 
Convention 
1977: World Plan of Action  
on the Ozone Layer 
(UNEP) 
1979: World Climate Conference 
1980- 1985: Helsinki Protocol 
(sulphur) 
1988: Sofia Protocol 
(nitrogen) 
1981- negotiations 
1985: "framework" 
Convention 
1987:Montreal Protocol (MP) 
1988: Toronto Conference 
1989: Hague and Nordwijk Conferences
1990- 1994: Oslo Protocol 
(sulphur)  
1999: Gothenburg  
Protocol (GP) 
(multi-pollutants) 
1990-1999: Amendments  
and Adjustments  
of the MP 
1990: 2nd World Climate Conf. 
1991- negotiations 
1992: Framework Convention (UNFCCC)
1997: Kyoto Protocol (KP) (completed 
with the 2001 Marrakesh Accords) 
2000- 2012: Amendment  
and Adjustment  
of the GP 
2007: Further adjustment  
of the MP 
2005/2007/2011- new rounds of 
negotiations (Montreal, Bali, Durban)
2012: Amendment of the KP (Doha) 
2015: Paris Agreement (PA) 
 
Feature and  
building block 
Acid rain  
policy regime 
Ozone layer  
policy regime 
Climate change  
policy regime 
Stepwise approach:  
gradual strengthening 
of the mitigation 
obligations  
"framework" 
convention followed 
by protocols and a 
series of decisions 
"framework" convention; 
its concretizing protocol 
followed by amendments, 
adjustments 
framework convention; protocol 
(and decisions) and its amendment;  
a new, framework type "global" 
agreement (2015) 
Mitigation obligations: 
quantified targets  
quantified 
emissions control 
targets (AAPs)  
quantified production 
control targets (ODS) 
KP: quantified emissions control 
targets (GHGs); PA: nationally 
determined targets/efforts 
Differentiation:  
differentiated obligations 
(for response policies 
and measures) 
country-by-country 
targets  
(1994 Protocol) 
MP: longer term 
compliance period for 
the developing countries 
KP: concrete mitigation targets for ICs
PA: targets to be communicated later; 
general reference to actions, 
enhanced efforts by DCs 
Flexibility instruments: 
for cooperative 
fulfilment  
joint implementation 
(1994 Protocol,  
but w/o rules) 
joint fulfilment;  
trading with volumes of 
ODS-production 
KP: joint implementation;  
trading with emission allowances;  
PA: cooperative mechanism/approach
Science-policy 
interface: institutional 
arrangements 
expert level working 
group on effects, 
EMEP Steering Body
expert panels on 
strategies, effects, etc. 
expert level body on scientific 
advice and close link with IPCC 
Financial mechanism: 
for assisting developing 
countries 
 Multilateral Fund (1990-) 
(GEF to assist EiTs 1992-)
GEF climate portfolio (1996-);  
Green Climate Fund (2010-)  
Compliance mechanism:  
for the facilitation and  
enforcement of 
implementation 
facilitative 
mechanism (1994-) 
facilitative mechanism, 
incl. potential sanctions 
(1992-) 
KP: compliance mechanism,  
incl. potential sanctions (2001-) 
PA: facilitative mechanism 
Conditions  
for entry into force:  
aggregated indicator  
 MP: threshold for 
aggregated production 
by the ICs 
threshold for aggregated emissions 
(KP:) by the ICs,  
(PA:) by all Parties 
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Phased approach. Similarly to the acid rain and ozone layer policy regimes 
and for analogous reasons, the climate negotiations resulted in gradually 
strengthened outcomes by starting with a framework convention in 1992 and 
continuing with some more ambitious commitments and actions from 1997 on. 
In this case, such a stepwise approach was justified not only by slowly 
dissipating scientific uncertainties (e.g., on the forcing factors or the possible 
future behaviour of the system), but also by the prolonged discussions on the 
differentiated responsibilities for this global hazard and the considerable inertia 
of the key GHG emitting economic sectors. The responsibility was and remained 
a critical question, since it stemmed from the huge differences in the historical 
and gradually varying GHG emissions and in the consequent shares of the 
countries in the increase and excess of the atmospheric concentrations of these 
gases. Despite the framework character of the 1992 convention (according to its 
title and general substance), yet it contained an important commitment on 
emissions control by the industrialized countries, viz. the stabilization of their 
emissions by 2000 compared to the 1990 reference level (as a default baseline, 
while EiTs were entitled to have some flexibility in this regard). It was followed 
by the 1997 Kyoto Protocol already with a moderate emissions reduction 
commitment by almost the same country group, and by the 2012 Doha 
Amendment of the KP with even more stringent emission reduction obligations, 
but for a considerably smaller group of the industrialized countries. The 
particular quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives (QELRO) and 
commitments (QELRC) were defined in the 1997 KP and later in its 2012 
amendment on a country-by-country basis similarly to the 1994 (second) sulphur 
protocol. Contrary to that approach, the 2015 Paris Agreement did not include 
any quantified mitigation target, but (i) it only concretized the ultimate objective 
of the Convention by referring to 2 °C and 1.5 °C as the critical limit values for 
the global average surface temperature increase above pre-industrial levels; and 
(ii) for the temperature goal, it included a rather general roadmap for the overall 
emissions control, i.e., to reach global peaking of GHG emissions as soon as 
possible and to undertake rapid reductions thereafter, so as to achieve a balance 
between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of GHGs in 
the second half of this century (in other words, to reach decarbonisation or zero 
net GHG emissions). As their contributions to the global response to climate 
change, the progressive quantified emissions control targets by the PA’s Parties 
will be nationally determined and communicated later.  
Differentiation. The concept of the common but differentiated 
responsibilities (CBDR) was unanimously accepted as the guiding principle for 
this policy regime. In particular, it meant the acknowledgment of the differences 
in the above-mentioned historical GHG emissions. Its consequence was the 
strong differentiation of the obligations between the developed and developing 
countries. In this regard, the countries’ respective capabilities and national 
circumstances were also considered as important factors. This approach was clearly 
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reflected in the emissions controlling provisions of the KP and DA, which set 
legally binding quantified commitments for the industrialized countries4 (ICs) 
and referred to the mitigation actions of the developing countries (DCs) in line 
with the key preambular paragraph of the Convention: "Noting that (..) per 
capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively low and that the share 
of global emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet their 
social and development needs". Moreover, the developed countries were also 
expected to undertake the provision of financial and technological assistance to 
the DCs in order to build and enhance their capacities for the assessment of 
emissions, development of climate response policies, and preparation for the 
adverse climatic impacts. The Paris Agreement repeated such a distinction, 
namely, by referring to emission reduction targets of the ICs and mitigation 
efforts of the DCs to be nationally determined, however, already encouraging 
the DCs to set also emissions control targets at a later stage. Some 
differentiation was also provided for other components of this policy regime 
(e.g., for the national communications on emissions and measures).  
An international emission trading system was established by the KP in 
1997. It was initiated by the USA by referring to its efficient internal (federal) 
SO2 allowance trading scheme. Moreover, the joint implementation instrument 
was introduced as another flexibility mechanism, by means of which one 
industrialized country could transfer emission reduction units (quotas) 
originating from a project to another such country that partly or fully financed 
the project. In international terms, the KP’s trading system was somewhat 
similar to the bilateral trading option for CFC production quotas under the 1987 
MP, however, there was a very limited practical utilization of the latter one. A 
joint implementation option was agreed for the sulphur emissions by the 1994 
protocol to the CLRTAP, but as it was indicated above, that was never used by 
any Parties in lack of the agreed rules for its application. Nevertheless, these two 
international precedents and operation of the above mentioned federal scheme in 
the USA provided useful background for the elaboration of the terms for those 
two supplementary mechanisms of the climate change policy regime. (The 
Clean Development Mechanism of the KP realized a very much different, 
innovative approach.) Because of significant differences in experiences and 
positions on such flexibility instruments, only the general provisions for the 
market-based and non-market cooperative mechanisms were included in the 
Paris Agreement, which applicability depends on when and how their terms and 
concrete procedures will be determined.  
Science-policy relations. The state-of-art scientific knowledge closely 
motivated the rapid progress in the acid rain and ozone layer policy regimes, and 
some dedicated institutional arrangements were made in both cases to 
                                                 
4 We use the term of "industrialized countries" (ICs) for the group of the developed countries and the countries with the economies in 
transition, which are listed in the Annex I of the UNFCCC and referred to also in the Annex B of the KP.  
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systematically channel the new observational and research information to the 
negotiators (through working groups and expert panels). These experiences have 
contributed to setting up the relevant institutional mechanisms for an interactive 
science-policy dialogue to assist the climate negotiations. For this purpose, the 
role and functions of a permanent advisory body were already defined by the 
1992 Convention5, and a close working contact was maintained with the IPCC. 
The periodically published assessment reports of the IPCC had significant 
influence on the multilateral negotiations and their outcomes: e.g., the 
conclusions of the 1990 first report on the Convention (1992), the outcomes of 
the second report in 1995 on the Kyoto Protocol (1997), and the policy relevant 
scientific assessments of the fifth report (2013/2014) on the elaboration and 
adoption of the Paris Agreement (2015).  
Enforcement. A comprehensive mechanism was elaborated for the 
evaluation of occasional non-compliance of a Party with its commitments under 
the KP, which rules were adopted only in 2001 (as part of the Marrakesh 
Accords). The lessons from such instruments established earlier were taken into 
account, as well as, the very complex nature of reporting on the GHG emissions, 
various climate policies, and measures by the Parties, and as a consequence, the 
elaborateness of the KP’s mechanism went well beyond that of the compliance 
systems for the acid rain and the ozone layer policy regimes: "The Kyoto 
Protocol has thus given rise to a non-compliance procedure, which is among the 
most elaborate and innovative of its kind, while the Compliance Committee (..) 
is one of the most powerful and independent committees of its kind established 
by an environmental convention" (Maljean-Dubois, 2010). For the sake of 
enforcement, one possible sanction for non-compliance could lead to the 
temporal suspension of the eligibility of a Party for using the KP’s flexibility 
mechanisms. This option reminds a similar opportunity within the ozone layer 
policy regime, however, with more serious implications in the case of the KP. 
Recently, a more cautious formula was included in the Paris Agreement 
obviously because of the universal nature of certain obligations: a mechanism 
for the facilitation of implementation of and promotion of compliance with the 
provisions of the PA and the relevant committee with only facilitative and non-
punitive functions (which concrete terms of reference should be determined 
later).  
Financial assistance for the developing countries was considered as a 
crucial prerequisite for their participation in the common global climate 
protecting endeavour, so that the financial mechanism was established and 
outlined already in the framework convention, which operation was undertaken 
by the Global Environment Facility (GEF). Primarily, it aimed to assist the 
developing countries and, to a less extent, the countries with economies in 
                                                 
5 "A subsidiary body for scientific and technological advice is hereby established to provide the Conference of the Parties (..) with timely 
information and advice on scientific and technological matters relating to the Convention." (UNFCCC, Art. 9.1) The author of this paper 
was elected as the first chairman of that body (SBSTA), and in that capacity (ex officio), he was also the member of the Bureau of the COP.  
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transition. In a sense it was comparable to the Multilateral Fund for the Montreal 
Protocol together with the support from the GEF to the EiTs. Moreover, such a 
similarity became even more apparent when the COP of the climate convention 
established its "own" Green Climate Fund in 2010 to channel financial resources 
to DCs to support their mitigation and adaptation related actions.  
A specific condition for entry into force (EiF) has guaranteed that the KP 
could have its legal power only if the key "players" become Parties to it. This 
idea was similar to the special EiF criteria of the Montreal Protocol. Besides 
the requirement of having already at least 55 ratifyers, there was an additional 
condition, namely, this group of the Parties had to incorporate industrialized 
countries (ICs listed in Annex I of the Convention), which accounted in total 
for at least 55 percent of the total CO2 emissions for 1990 of all the ICs. This 
very high threshold can be better understood by taking into account that in 
1990 the Russian Federation and the USA together were responsible for more 
than half of that total. (Of course, this situation has profoundly changed when 
the USA pulled out of the Protocol.) The Paris Protocol formally repeats the 
similar 55–55 condition for its entry into force, however, because of its global 
nature, not exclusively the ratifying industrialized countries’ emissions will 
be added up to meet the 55 percent emission threshold, but the annual 
emissions of all the ratifyers (those from the group of the developing 
countries, as well).  
In sum, important precedential features of the acid rain and the ozone layer 
policy regimes had their positive effects on the construction of the climate 
change policy architecture, however, as it will be demonstrated below, after a 
while, the evolvement and effectiveness of the climate change policy 
mechanisms considerably diverged from those for the two other atmospheric 
issues.  
4. Increasing science-policy gap  
in addressing the global climate change hazard 
"The production and consumption of the majority of harmful ozone-depleting chemicals 
has been successfully phased out, in both developed and developing countries." (UNEP, 2012) 
"Noting with grave concern the significant gap between the aggregate effect of Parties’ mitigation pledges (..)  
and aggregate emission pathways consistent with having a likely chance of holding the increase in global  
average temperature below 2 °C or 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels." (COP Decision 2/CP.18, 2012) 
 
Effectiveness of acid rain and ozone layer policy regimes. When the 1997 
Kyoto Protocol entered into force in early 2005, it was the general expectation 
that the international treatment of the climate change hazard will somehow 
follow the examples of the relatively rapid and effective development of the 
international policy mechanisms for tackling the "acid rain" (more generally, the 
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long-range air pollution) and the ozone layer depletion problems. Due to the 
increasingly stringent measures, the emissions and transboundary transmissions 
of the AAPs have drastically dropped in the pan-European region. In the same 
way, thanks to gradually enhanced provisions of the MP, the production, 
consumption, and atmospheric release of an ever expanding group of ODS was 
taken under control, eventually many of these substances were phased-out and 
substituted by "ozone-friendly" ones for various applications. In these cases, the 
rapidly enriching knowledge base has had its decisive effect on policymaking 
besides many other supportive factors.  
The climate change science-policy paradox. Contrary to the above cases, 
a growing gap could be observed primarily between the actual levels of the 
globally aggregated GHG emission reductions and the level of reductions that 
was from time to time recommended by the large group of scientists backing 
the work of the IPCC, the UNEP, and various international academic 
organizations. Since 1990, the IPCC has regularly published science-based 
assessments, inter alia, on those levels of global emission reductions, which 
would make possible, with certain degrees of confidence, the avoidance of 
dangerous human interference with the climate system. These were 
accompanied by evaluation of the mitigation potential of the economic 
sectors and by recommendations for specific mitigation and adaptation 
policies ("climate-friendly" measures in various sectors, sustainable forest 
management, opportunities for increased climate resilience, etc.). In addition 
to that, the UNEP issues Emissions Gap Reports (EGR) since 2010, and the 
scope of its reports is the comparison of the theoretical emissions reduction 
pathways for remaining below the presumably still safe global temperature 
increase limits with the actual, agreed, or pledged global emission reductions. 
In this section of the paper, the increasing deviations of the international 
policy responses from these science-based advices and the key factors of 
these deviations will be discussed. We consider the evolution of the science-
policy interplay in terms of the influence of growing scientific awareness 
about the global climate change hazard on the international climate policy 
cooperation for the last four decades. This process was more or less 
analogous to those for the acidification and ozone depletion hazards for about 
two decades, however, for various reasons, there is a widening science-policy 
gap concerning especially the abatement or mitigation targets since the turn 
of the century in case of the climate change problem (Table 2). This is a 
climate change science-policy paradox, i.e., the contradiction between the 
increasing knowledge level on an environmental problem and the aggregated 
effect of the actions to cope with that problem. There are other forms of 
paradoxes embedded in the climate policies as contradictory feedbacks 
(Fölster and Nyström, 2010; Jordan et al., 2012). 
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Table 2. Timeline of climate change science-policy relations  
(S: short-term emissions control, L: longer-term emissions control; /1990 or /2000 is the 
reference year; "emissions" refer to GHG-emissions; * is for the "2°C limit" after 2007)  
 Emissions control targets:  
science-based recommendations* 
Emissions control targets:  
policy approach or commitment 
1985- 1985 Villach; 1987 Villach, Bellagio 
S) stabilization of ICs emissions 
L) stabilization of the atmospheric 
concentrations 
1988 Toronto; 1989 The Hague, Nordwijk, UNEP 
S) 20% reduction or stabilization of  
the ICs emissions by 2005 
L) stabilization of the atmospheric 
concentrations 
1990- 1990-1992 IPCC AR1  
(1990 WG-III, 1992 Supplement)  
S) stabilization of ICs emissions 
L) stabilization of the atmospheric 
concentrations 
1992 UNFCCC 
S) stabilization of ICs emissions by 2000 (/1990) 
L) stabilization of the atmospheric 
concentrations 
1994 The Convention enters into force (EiF) 
1995- 1995 IPCC AR2 
S) reduction of ICs emissions  
L) stabilization of global CO2-emissions 
within several decades followed  
by substantial reductions (/1990) 
2001 IPCC AR3 
S) reduction of the ICs emissions  
beyond KP levels 
L) stabilization of global emissions 
within few decades  
1997 Kyoto Protocol (KP) 
S) 5% reduction of the ICs emissions  
by 2012 (/1990)  
L) reference to the ultimate objective of the 
Convention (stabilization of  
the atmospheric GHG concentrations) 
2001 Marrakech Accords 
completing the rules for the KP 
2004 Protocol’s special EiF criteria are fulfilled 
(EiF: Febr. 2005) 
2005- 2007 IPCC AR4 
S) stabilization of global emissions 
within 10–15 years;  
25–40% reduction of ICs emissions 
by about 2020 (/1990)  
L) global emission reductions:  
at least 50% by 2050;  
80–95% reduction of  
the ICs emissions by 2050 (/1990) 
2010 UNEP-EGR 
S) increase of global emissions:  
less than 17% by 2020 (/1990) 
2005 Mandate for dialogue  
on long-term actions (Montreal) 
2007 Mandate for negotiations  
on future actions (Bali)  
2009 Copenhagen Accord (CA),  
a general reference to IPCC AR4; 
S) peaking of global and nat’l emissions  
"as soon as possible" according to CA: 
"Cancun pledges" by countries in 2010 
2010 UNEP-EGR 
S) global effect of "pledges":  
30–40% increase by 2020 (/1990) 
2012 Doha Amendment to the KP 
S) 18% reduction of the ICs emissions  
by 2020 (w/o 5 ICs) (/1990) 
2013- 2013-2014 IPCC AR5 
S) emission peak years for all regions in 
2010-2020; ca. 30% reduction of ICs 
CO2-emissions by 2030 (/2010) 
L) 40-70% global emission reductions 
by 2050 (/2010) 
2014, 2015 UNEP-EGR  
(scenarios from IPCC AR5 database) 
S) increase of global emissions:  
less than 14% by 2030 (/1990) 
2015 INDCs by Oct 2015  
(UNFCCC, 20151, UNEP-EGR, 20152): 
S) global effect of INDCs1:  
37–52% increase by 2030 (/1990)  
S) global effect of INDCs2:  
40–54% increase by 2030 (/1990) 
2015 Paris Agreement  
S) global peaking "as soon as possible"  
L) zero net emissions  
in the 2nd half of this century 
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4.1. The scientifically recommended  
and the actually accepted levels of mitigation responses  
Initiatives for the climate change policy regime. The scientific community 
started to urge the policy measures on the climate problem from the mid-1980s. 
The conclusions of the 1985 Villach conference included the following 
recommended actions based on the assessment of the climate change hazard 
(Villach, 1985): "Governments (..) should take into account the results of this 
assessment in their policies on social and economic development, environmental 
programmes, and control of emissions of radiatively active gases. (..) Major 
uncertainties remain in predictions of changes (..) Nevertheless, the understanding 
of the greenhouse question is sufficiently developed that scientists and policy-
makers should begin an active collaboration to explore the effectiveness of 
alternative policies and adjustments." As a follow-up, two expert-level meetings 
already focused on concretizing the policy areas which, according to the joint 
meeting report, should cover both the limitation and adaptation strategies. The 
priority actions for the former one included the re-examination of long-term 
energy strategies, reduction of deforestation, and increase of forest area, 
moreover, the limitation of the growth of non-CO2 GHGs in the atmosphere. 
The report also suggested the examination "of the need for an agreement on a 
law of the atmosphere as a global commons or the need to move towards a 
convention along the lines of that developed for ozone" (WMO-UNEP, 1988). 
These science-based suggestions strongly motivated the outcomes of those 
conferences, which took place in 1988 and 1989 with the participation of many 
government representatives, as well. Their policy-oriented declarations included 
already some quantified proposals for emissions control and some other actions 
(afforestation, controlling other GHG emissions, international financial means, 
etc.). In this regard, the key points by the Toronto conference (1988) were as 
follows: stabilization of the atmospheric concentrations of CO2, for which 
emission reductions of more than 50% would be necessary for long-term, and as 
an initial global goal, the reduction of emissions by approximately 20% of 1988 
levels by the year 2005 should be achieved. The high-level meetings held in The 
Hague and Nordwijk in 1989 emphasized the need of urgent stabilization of the 
emissions by the industrialized countries (ICs) as a first step. The UNEP 
Governing Council reiterated a similar requirement for all the emissions of 
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases at its meeting in 1989 (Nairobi). As 
we see, these international policy reactions were in line with the science-based 
recommendations at least with those that concerned the most immediate actions 
(emission stabilization, launching negotiations).  
Stages of mitigation policy development. From the early 1990s, the 
negotiations generally resulted in the shorter term mitigation obligations for 
subsequent decadal periods. The 1992 convention comprised of emission 
stabilization objectives for the ICs at the 1990 level by 2000. The 2007 Kyoto 
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Protocol set reduction obligations for them with the targets expressed as the 
annual averages for the 2008–2012 period. The Doha Amendment in 2012 
defined new emission reduction commitments for a "shrunken" group of ICs by 
2020. The negotiations on a new global instrument started about a decade ago 
and its preparations became more concentrated after 2012 with the intention to 
reach a deal on more ambitious actions for the post 2020 period. After 2009, 
many countries communicated their pledges and intentions with more or less 
concrete national targets for 2030 or some other target date. Eventually, that new 
agreement was concluded at the end of 2015, however without any concrete 
emission reduction "roadmap". The negotiations during all these stages could 
rely on inputs from the research community. The series of assessment reports of 
the IPCC from 1990 and the Emission Gap Reports (EGR) by the UNEP from 
2010 presented scenarios with global emissions estimates, aggregated emissions 
of the industrialized countries, and relevant emission pathways, adherence to 
which could guarantee with some chance to stay below the 2 °C global warming 
limit. In order to demonstrate the changing science-policy gap, we now compare 
the science-based global emission recommendations with the global targets from 
the above-mentioned legal instruments or with aggregated effects of the 
countries’ "pledges" provided at the later stages of this negotiating process.  
The Convention. The IPCC published its first report in 1990 and issued 
supplemental assessments in early 1992. These reports included scenarios for 
GHG emissions control, and specifically, the IPCC’s third working group (on 
the response strategies) provided initial evaluations on the feasibility of meeting 
the different quantitative targets. Besides a general reference to the urgency of 
the stabilization of these emissions, the 1990 and 1992 reports made clear that 
"in the near term, no significant progress in limiting global emissions will occur 
without actions by the industrialized countries. Some countries have already 
decided to stabilize or reduce their emissions". The rationality for a phased 
approach was also pointed out (IPCC, 1990–1992): "The IPCC recommends a 
programme for the development and implementation of global, comprehensive 
and phased action for the resolution of the global warming problem under a 
flexible and progressive approach." The existing uncertainties and the need for 
further in-depth studies warranted the carefulness of such formulations, i.e., the 
inadequacy of information available at that stage to make sound and detailed 
policy analyses. These complex IPCC messages had their equally cautious 
imprints on the ministerial declaration of the Second World Climate Conference 
(November 1990, Geneva) and also on the outcomes of the international 
negotiations, which culminated in adoption of the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The convention included (i) short term 
obligations, such as the emission stabilization commitment for the industrialized 
countries (listed in the Annex I) by 2000 at the default 1990 reference level 
(base year) and a general provision for all Parties (i.e., also for the developing 
countries) to elaborate their national climate change programmes; and (ii) the 
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long-term ultimate objective of the stabilization of atmospheric GHG 
concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system (UNFCCC, 1992). Obviously, both the scientific and 
policymaking communities wished to have some more time for getting more 
information on the climate change process, its expected impacts, and on the 
technical and economic feasibility of stronger policies. The Convention entered 
into force in 1994, and some years later it had a universal membership. 
Afterwards, the implementation and adequacy of this agreement was regularly 
discussed during the annual sessions of the Conference of the Parties (COP).  
The Protocol. The next comprehensive assessment of the IPCC was 
completed in 1995 (IPCC, 1995). The refined scenarios for CO2 concentration 
stabilization were linked to the relevant emission pathways, and it was made 
clear that even if global CO2 emissions were maintained at then levels, they 
would lead to a nearly constant rate of increase in atmospheric concentrations 
for very long time. It was deduced that only the urgent halting of the emission 
growth followed by a systematic decrease of these emissions could lead to 
presumably still safe stabilization levels of the atmospheric GHG 
concentrations. More concretely, for instance, it was indicated that the 450 ppmv 
CO2 stabilization scenario could be achieved only if global anthropogenic CO2 
emissions returned to the 1990 levels within approximately 40 years from that 
time, and dropped substantially below those levels subsequently. It was also 
clear from these scenarios and the related assessments that in order to achieve 
that global emission peaking, the industrialized countries had to commit 
themselves to considerable emission reductions (by taking into account their 
higher historical emissions, i.e., the CBDR principle). The new round of 
negotiations started in 1995 (based on the so-called "Berlin Mandate") and 
eventually those were leading to the preparation of the Kyoto Protocol (KP) and 
its adoption in 1997. The Protocol set an average 5% reduction obligation for the 
group of the industrialized countries (Annex I Parties) compared to the 1990 
level of their emissions, to be achieved in the period of 2008–2012. Although it 
was much lower than the GHG reduction levels stemming from the scientific 
evaluations, nevertheless, it was considered as a moderate but important short-
term first stage in a stepwise approach. In a sense, it still followed to some 
extent the initial phases of the acid rain and the ozone layer policy regimes. The 
detailed rules for some of the critical components of the KP were approved in 
2001 (Marrakech Accords), and at last the KP came into force in early 2005 
(already w/o the USA but thanks to the ratification by the Russian Federation in 
2004, which was a decisive act in view of the specific EiF condition).  
Coming to a standstill. In the meantime, the IPCC’s third report was issued 
in 2001 and had some catalytic role on deliberations on the future climate policy 
cooperation that began in 2005 (after the KP entered into force). Based on that 
report, it was evident that for stabilizing the atmospheric CO2 concentrations 
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e.g., at 450 ppmv level, the global emissions should reach a ceiling within a few 
decades and already on short term, it "may require emission reductions during 
the period 2008 to 2012 in Annex I countries that are significantly stronger than 
the Kyoto Protocol commitments" (IPCC, 2001). Contrary to the essence of 
these conclusions, in 2005 (Montreal) the Parties could hardly reach consensus 
even on the formats and general objectives of dealing with the post-2012 period. 
It can be considered as the beginning of a rapidly widening gap between the 
global climate change science and the international policy responses. At least, the 
dispute on formalities of the future negotiations and their general directions 
could be resolved in 2007, and the clear-cut messages of the fourth IPCC report 
had some influence in that regard (IPCC, 2007). The report, especially, its part 
contributed by the third working group of the IPCC, clearly stated that: (i) 
keeping the 2° C objective within reach requires stabilization of the atmospheric 
concentration of GHGs in line with the lowest stabilization level assessed, i.e., 
450 ppmv CO2eq; (ii) this will assume that the global GHG emissions peak 
within the next 10 to 15 years, and then those are substantially reduced at least 
by 50% below 1990 levels by 2050; and (iii) the groups of the industrialized 
(ICs) and the developing countries (DCs) contribute to those short and long-term 
CO2eq reduction goals in line with their different shares in the overall emissions. 
These pertinent short and long-term reduction targets in 2020 and 2050 for the 
ICs are 25-40% and 80-95%, respectively, while for the DCs their contributions 
were suggested as follows: substantial deviation of the emissions from baseline 
by 2020 in some developing regions and substantial deviation from baseline in all 
developing regions by 2050. These science-based assessments were indirectly 
cited in the 2007 negotiating mandate (Bali), however, after two years of intense 
deliberations instead of agreeing on new targets and commitments, the only 
concrete product of the Copenhagen summit (2009) was that the delegates took 
note of an accord that included indications for: deep cuts in global emissions; 
peaking of global and national emissions as soon as possible; quantified 
economy wide emissions targets by the industrialized countries by 2020. While 
these general provisions were not complemented with any concrete goals, all 
Parties were invited to submit their "pledges": quantified economy wide 
emissions targets for 2020 by the Annex I Parties and further mitigation actions 
by the non-Annex I Parties. These submissions were reviewed at next COP 
session (Cancun), and the total effect of these "Cancun pledges" was also 
compared with the emission pathways consistent with a "likely" chance of 
meeting the 2° C threshold (UNEP, 2010). The results of this gap analysis 
demonstrated the need to limit the growth of overall emissions by 2020 to a 
maximum of 17% in contrast to the 30-40% range of the global emission 
increase that was deduced from those pledges and the four policy scenarios (a 
combination of the unconditional and conditional pledges with "lenient" or strict 
rules of compliance).  
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"Prolonging" the Kyoto Protocol as a transient solution. We now turn our 
attention to the legally binding deal, which was arranged in 2011 and finalized 
in 2012 as an amendment to the KP by extending it to a second commitment 
period. This Doha Amendment (DA) included quantified emission limitation or 
reduction commitments (QELRC) by a group of the industrialized countries with 
the target year of 2020. The aggregated unconditional commitments equalled to 
18% emission reduction, however, already five industrialized countries did not 
take part in this deal, namely: Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, and the 
USA. Many participants of the deal indicated also a conditional higher emission 
reduction target (e.g., the EU-28 a 30% reduction besides the unconditional 20% 
target). If one were combining the emissions control "low pledges" of those five 
countries (e.g. 4% below the 1990 level by the USA) with the unconditional 
commitments by the ICs inscribed in the DA, then such a virtual aggregated 
target would result in a less than ten percent reduction by 2020 below the 1990 
level by all the ICs (listed in the convention). Whatever would be the exact 
estimate for this whole group, the aggregated target for 2020 could mean a 
significant decline from the science-based emission reduction range for the ICs 
that was derived in the 2007 IPCC report. Moreover, the DA covered only about 
15% of the global GHG emissions (Sterk, 2012), since it did not address the 
goals of the above mentioned five ICs, neither the actions by the DCs by 2020. 
Therefore, it remained unclear, how the overwhelming majority of the countries 
plan their concrete measurable, reportable, and verifiable mitigation and other 
climate related policies and measures. Nevertheless, the Doha Amendment is an 
essential achievement: without its adoption, apparently, no progress could be 
achieved at all in the parallel negotiations of a new global instrument.  
New policy-relevant scientific assessments. The year of 2013 brought about 
a new stage both in the communication of new scientific results and the 
international climate policy cooperation. The first part of the fifth report of the 
IPCC was published in 2013 and it was followed by other volumes of the report 
in 2014. The statements on the human interference with the global climate 
system, on the scenarios of its future state, and on the expected impacts reflected 
a much higher level of confidence. Comprehensive information was also 
provided on the possible mitigation and adaptation strategies. Regarding the 
future emission pathways, besides the general indications of the need for 
substantial emissions reductions over the next few decades and for near zero net 
anthropogenic emissions by the end of the century, more concrete GHG 
emission reduction assessments were given for 2050 and some estimates only 
for the CO2 emissions for 2030. The apparently most essential statement on the 
mid-century global emissions was as follows: "Emissions scenarios leading to 
GHG concentrations in 2100 of about 450 ppm CO2eq or lower are likely to 
maintain warming below 2° C over the 21st century relative to pre-industrial 
levels. These scenarios are characterized by 40% to 70% global anthropogenic 
GHG emissions reductions by 2050 compared to 2010." For the same warming 
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threshold (actually, for the relevant range of long-term CO2eq concentration 
scenarios, i.e., for 430–530 ppm CO2eq), regional emissions peak years were 
derived by means of different models, and CO2 emission reductions in 2030 over 
the 2010 levels were also presented in the report (IPCC, 2013–2014). According 
to these calculations, the peak years for all the regions were set between 2010 
and 2020 in order to be in line with the above-mentioned scenarios; therefore, 
the global emissions ought not to grow after the end of the present decade. But 
what might be much more informative for the negotiators, those were the 
assessments of the transient mitigation efforts by the regions (which lead to 
those 430–530 ppm CO2eq scenarios in 2100): "The contribution of different 
regions to mitigation is directly related to the formulation of international 
climate policies. In idealized implementation scenarios, which assume a uniform 
global carbon price, the extent of mitigation in each region depends most 
heavily on relative baseline emissions, regional mitigation potentials, and terms 
of trade effects. (..) In general, emissions peak in the OECD-1990 sooner than in 
other countries with higher baseline growth. Similarly, emissions are reduced in 
the OECD-1990 countries by 2030 relative to today, but they may increase in 
other regions, particularly the fast-growing Asian and MAF regions." The 
concrete quantitative estimates (for the 430–530 ppm CO2eq scenarios) suggest 
the average 32% regional CO2 emission reductions in 2030 below the 2010 
emission levels for the group of the ICs (the OECD members in 1990 and the 
EiTs), 35% reduction in average for the Latin-American region, and show a 
range of emissions control rates around zero (i.e., stabilization) for the Asian 
region and the MAF (Middle East and Africa). The above assessments offered 
important orientation values for the ongoing negotiations. The overall scale of 
these most recent emission-related figures for the 2° C criterion seems to be 
even more demanding than the ones from the previous assessments, in particular 
for the industrialized countries as a whole. By using the same scenarios from the 
IPCC database, the UNEP report (UNEP, 2014) offered even more relevant 
information for the gap assessments, namely the global GHG emission levels in 
2030 "for a likely chance of staying within the 2 °C limit" following a least-cost 
pathway from 2020 which are: 42 GtCO2eq (range: 31–44), or +14% relative to 
1990 emissions and –14% relative to 2010 emissions. The use of 1990 default 
reference year and emissions level is essential not only for comparability 
purposes (with former assessments and commitments), but also for realizing the 
very significant actual changes, which clearly demonstrate the inadequacy of the 
existing policy responses since the early 1990s. Before turning to the most 
recent "offers", let us compare these theoretically critical thresholds with the 
actual data: global emissions have grown since 1990 by more than 45% and 
were approximately 54 GtCO2eq in 2012 (UNEP, 2014).  
International climate policy cooperation beyond 2020. Now the basic 
question is that, how and to what extent these new science-based assessments 
were taken into account in the course of preparation and finalization of the new 
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agreement adopted in 2015 for the post-2020 period. The too general, 
unquantified emissions control "roadmap" and the requirements of the Paris 
Agreement for all the Parties to communicate later their concrete emission-
related contributions were already mentioned above and obviously, these 
provisions are not applicable at these stage for any science-policy gap 
assessment. The "recommended" global emissions reduction pathways presented 
by the IPCC or the UNEP would be valuable for top-down distribution 
approaches (based on the common but differentiated responsibilities), but as a 
matter of fact, the negotiations were again centered around a bottom-up process 
(likewise the KP and the DA). As a matter of fact, the majority of the countries 
(or country groups in the case of the EU) individually formulated and 
communicated their possible emissions control targets beyond 2020 in the 
framework of the "intended nationally determined contributions" (INDC). 
Obviously, the consideration of the aggregated global levels of these 
(unconditional and conditional) quantified national targets for 2030 or 2050 is 
especially important in light of the "reasons for concern" depicted by the IPCC 
in its latest report. The synthesis of these intended contributions submitted by 
October 2015 represented three quarters of Parties to the Convention and 86 
percent of global emissions in 2010, and the aggregate effect for 2030 would be 
56.7 (53.1 to 58.6) GtCO2eq in 2030 (UNFCCC, 2015). In relative terms, these 
estimates would mean 11–22% increase of the aggregated emissions in 2030 in 
relation to the 2010 level, or 37–52% increase in relation to the global emission 
level in 1990. A rather similar assessment is derived in the Emission Gap Report 
(UNEP, 2015), namely, 54 GtCO2eq (range: 52–57) for 2030, which 
corresponds to 46% (range 40–54) relative increase compared to the 1990 level. 
These clearly indicate a huge deviation from those targets which were 
considered necessary theoretically, and it means a further significant increase in 
the science-policy gap in tackling this hazardous global environmental process.  
4.2. Some basic factors behind the difficulties  
with the climate change policy regime 
There are several factors which may explain the complications with the 
international climate change policy-making. Their nature and significance can 
be better understood in a comparison with the acidification and ozone depletion 
cases. Four distinctive problematic areas are mentioned below; however, there 
are obviously other more or less critical ones, which should be taken into 
consideration to make the international policy regime more responsive to the 
climate change challenge.  
The operation of the global climate system governed by internal and 
external, natural and anthropogenic factors seems to be much more complex 
than the mechanisms of the acidification and ozone layer depletion processes. 
As a consequence, the detection of the present climate change signal and its 
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attribution to different drivers (forcing factors) is rather problematic because of 
the relatively low climate change signal-to-noise ratio (where the "noise" is the 
climatic variability in this context) and because of the diverse interactions and 
characteristic timescales of natural and human-induced contributions to the 
GHG cycles and to the impacts of the changing climatic conditions. The 
problem of signal-to-noise ratio also appears in the climate modelling (IPCC, 
2001); moreover, it necessitates careful approach to climate impact assessments 
and adaptation strategies as the impacts of the short-term and long-term 
processes overlap (Czelnai, 1980). The complexity of the system, in particular, 
the problems related to the detection of the global climate change signal are 
clearly manifested in a more prolonged and slower decrease of the scientific 
uncertainty level concerning the anthropogenic influences on the climate system 
and in turn, a longer time length between the improved degree of scientific 
knowledge and the agreements on the related international policy frameworks. 
That timespan was about one decade in case of the acidification and ozone 
depletion problems, but it took several decades for the climate change issue 
(with regard to the time periods between the confirmation of the adequate 
attribution hypotheses and the adoption of the first multilateral legal 
instruments).  
The substantial historical differences in responsibilities of various 
countries and country groups for the emerging climate change hazard have been 
a crucial factor together with their differing vulnerabilities, capabilities, socio-
economic problems, and interests, in influencing the international negotiations. 
The recognition of the mutual interdependence was the most important 
motivation ("push factor") to seek common ways and means for the solution of 
the three environmental problems discussed in this paper, but the above 
mentioned differences mattered much more seriously to the global climate 
policy-making case compared to the other two atmospheric problems.  
All key economic sectors somehow have their part in the climate change 
problem as GHG emitters and/or bearers of the impacts: energy sector, transport, 
various industrial activities (e.g., metallurgy, cement production), agriculture, 
forestry, healthcare, water management, nature conservation, etc. This means 
that for all these sectors and socio-economic activities efficient mitigation and/or 
adaptation policies should be developed at all levels. Therefore, it necessitates 
economy-wide national measures, while many of these policy areas have 
essential international dimensions in our globalized world. Sectoral policy-
making is especially challenging for those areas that are characterized by 
substantial inertia, which is typical of fossil fuel based energy and transport 
systems (also because of the so-called "lock-in" effects); to some extent, such 
inertia characterizes certain agricultural and industrial activities, as well. This 
situation was somewhat simpler for the other two environmental problems, 
especially in case of the ozone layer policy regime.  
36 
Technologies. At last, availability and effectiveness of the abatement and 
control technologies should be noted. For the acidification problem, relatively 
cost-effective emission source-oriented and end-of-pipe "technological fixes" 
could be shortly developed, such as the desulfurization of coal, crude oil or 
natural gas before their further utilization, the flue gas desulfurization 
technologies (which provide gypsum, a widely used material), or more 
generally, the industrial scrubbers for the AAPs, moreover, the catalytic 
converters for vehicles to reduce nitrogen emissions. The phase-out of the ODS 
and their replacement with "ozone-friendly" substitutes have become 
appropriate to cope with the ozone layer depletion hazard, which were 
accompanied by the disposal of the ODS from their surplus stocks or those 
recollected from various appliances. With the GHGs, in general, the situation is 
much more difficult, since there are no such relatively simple, cost-effective, 
widely applicable technological solutions. Some of the remarkable barriers to 
the existing carbon neutralizing technologies (including the so-called "negative 
emissions technologies", i.e., different land use, forestry related sequestration 
methods, or the rather controversial carbon capture and storage options) are 
referred to by UNEP (2014). Therefore, the gradual but comprehensive and 
environmentally sound decarbonisation of the entire economic systems based on 
sustainable production and consumption patterns, and parallel preparations for 
the already seemingly unavoidable changes can only be considered as the 
adequate strategy for tackling this global environmental problem.  
5. Conclusions 
The knowledge development and the initial steps in the international policy regime 
building in relation to the global climate change problem have been analyzed, as 
these proceeded parallel to the somewhat analogous processes for acidification and 
ozone layer depletion by the late 1970s. This synergy during the "inception phase" 
had some role not only in facilitating the enhancement of the global environmental 
observing systems and the international scientific cooperation, but also indirectly in 
conducting the relevant detection and attribution studies. With the rapid research 
progress on acidification and ozone layer depletion, the corresponding multilateral 
policy mechanisms were not only established and gradually strengthened within a 
relatively short time period, but some of their important features and building 
blocks served also as precedents or prototypes for the climate change policy 
architecture. But the climate change issue proved to be a much more complex 
problem, so the proper international policy responses could not be formulated so 
smoothly as it occurred for the other two large-scale atmospheric issues and their 
anthropogenic drivers. This kind of increasing asymmetry was also evaluated in 
this paper throughout the "international policy setup phase" by about the turn of the 
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20th century and the subsequent "divergent phase" for these environmental 
problems.  
Some of the important factors behind this lagging of the climate change 
response policies were also mentioned, and none of them can be easily overcome. 
Yet, all those should be tackled adequately. The reason for this is clearly stated by 
the recent IPCC report (IPCC, 2013–2014): "Without additional mitigation efforts 
beyond those in place today, and even with adaptation, warming by the end of the 
21st century will lead to high to very high risk of severe, widespread, and 
irreversible impacts globally (high confidence)." The directions of the further 
scientific research tasks are outlined by the IPCC and the World Climate 
Programme (i.e., its research component, WCRP); furthermore, an integrated 
concept is foreseen by the "Future Earth" programme, which is the ICSU initiative 
devoted to all key environment-related processes, their interactions, and possible 
future effects, including those associated with the climate change process. 
Concerning the science-based complex climate policy-making challenges, 
references were already made to the need of an economy-wide approach; however, 
it should be re-emphasized that the climate policy-making problem is not a self-
contained one, but inherently linked to a large range of other challenges (e.g., 
addressing the unsustainable resource use and land management, increasing waste 
streams, loss of biodiversity). Anyway, in light of the already solid scientific 
achievements and the possibility of the abrupt and irreversible changes, accurate 
policy responses are necessary amid remaining uncertainties, as it was so 
formulated by Stephen H. Schneider, to whom the Synthesis Report of the latest 
IPCC assessment report was dedicated (IPCC, 2013–2014): "Policymakers struggle 
with the need to make decisions that have far-reaching and often irreversible effects 
on both environment and society with sparse and imprecise information. (..) Strictly 
speaking, a surprise is an unanticipated outcome; by definition it is an unexpected 
event. Potential climate change and, more broadly, global environmental change 
are replete with this kind of surprise because of the enormous complexities of the 
processes and relationships involved (such as coupled ocean, atmosphere, and 
terrestrial systems) and our insufficient understanding of them. (..) as the rate of 
change of CO2 concentrations is one imaginable condition for surprise, the system 
would be less rapidly forced if decision makers chose to slow down the rate at 
which human activities modify the atmosphere. This would lower the likelihood of 
surprises." (Schneider and Kuntz-Duriseti, 2002). These ideas are even more valid 
in view of the latest observations and assessments. In principle, such an approach 
was reflected in the recently adopted new global deal, the Paris Agreement that 
stressed the need for an effective and progressive response to the urgent threat of 
climate change by reaching global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as 
possible and undertaking rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with best 
available science. But the setting of the relevant and concrete policy targets was 
postponed and consequently, as it was demonstrated in this paper, there is still a 
rapidly increasing science-policy gap in tackling this hazardous global problem.  
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